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New perspectives on organism-environment interactions in anthropology 
 
Emily A. Schultz 
St. Cloud State University 
eschultz@stcloudstate.edu 
 
Abstract 
Anthropologists contend that the organism-environment connections responsible 
for human evolution are indirect—mediated by culture. This chapter reviews influential 
twentieth-century anthropological interpretations of the cultural mediation of human 
adaptations to environments, arguing that ethnography and other qualitative forms of 
analysis reveal important phenomena overlooked by quantitative analysts committed to 
methodological individualism. It highlights work by post-positivist anthropologists, who 
describe relations among human and non-human organisms, cultural forms, and features of 
environments as “natural-cultural” networks, an approach reminiscent of developmental 
systems theory and niche construction. Evolutionary theorists have much to gain by 
incorporating these sophisticated, contemporary post-positivist anthropological 
understandings of culture into their models of human-environment connections. 
 
Keywords: ecological anthropology, cultural ecology, political ecology, niche construction, 
actor network theory 
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 Introduction 
In early twentieth-century North America, eugenicists were claiming to be able to 
sort and rank human populations in terms of biological “race,” arguing that such biological 
“races” were the direct products of past natural selection. Anthropologist Franz Boas and 
his students challenged such claims, not by denying that the human species had evolved by 
natural selection, but by arguing that the organism-environment connections that 
produced distinct human adaptations were indirect, mediated by culture; that is, by learned 
beliefs and behaviors acquired by human beings as members of particular social groups. 
Because culturally-mediated human connections to the environment were shared, 
newborn human individuals were spared having to invent new mediated connections to 
the environment on their own, from scratch. Cultural mediation of human-environment 
connections appeared to be ancient, associated with a long period of post-natal 
dependency, during which human children learned from their elders the skills and 
knowledge (including language) required for successful survival and reproduction. In sum, 
human organisms were conceived as highly generalized, behaviorally plastic social 
organisms whose adaptive connections to their environments varied from population to 
population, because each population’s connections to its environment were mediated by 
particular sets of cultural knowledge and skills, passed down from one generation to the 
next. Among other things, emphasis on the centrality of culturally mediated human 
connections to environments allowed anthropologists to explain human diversity without 
recourse to the concept of biological “race.”  
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Since Boas’s day, definitions of culture, and demonstrations of how culture mediates 
human adaptations to environments, have varied across subfields of anthropology, and 
have not been without contention (Abu-Lughod 1990, Trouillot 2002). Nevertheless, I 
argue here that contemporary post-positivist anthropological theorizing about culture can 
refine and strengthen understandings in theoretical biology about the roles culture may 
play in mediating human-environment connections. Post-positivist perspectives can be 
found in the work of anthropologists working across the subfields of biological 
anthropology, cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and archaeology, and they 
are well-established in such growing specialties as environmental anthropology and the 
anthropology of science, technology, and medicine (both of which regularly incorporate 
insights derived from a newer subfield, applied anthropology). To be sure, post-positivist 
anthropology remains controversial among those anthropologists who continue to believe 
that positivist science is science tout court, and it is ignored by theorists of cultural 
evolution who cast their discussions of the cultural mediation of human-environment 
connections in terms of gene-culture coevolution (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson 
and Boyd 2005; Durham 1991).  At the same time, most anthropologists who adopt post-
positivist perspectives often describe their diachronic analyses of culturally mediated 
human-environment connections as “historical” rather than “evolutionary,” and they rarely 
engage with selectionist and adaptationist forms of explanation. But it is also true that 
adaptationist and selectionist arguments offer few resources for illuminating the messy 
contingencies shaping the kinds of organism-environment entanglements of interest to 
post-positivist anthropologists.  
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In my view, serious scholarly discussions of organism-environment connections can 
no longer afford to ignore the post-positivist anthropological contributions reviewed in this 
essay, for at least three reasons: (1) this work demonstrates the breadth and sophistication 
of contemporary post-positivist anthropological analysis, and exposes the speciousness of 
allegations that rejecting positivism means rejecting science, or that criticizing selectionism 
means rejecting evolution; (2) this work highlights valuable insights gained from 
ethnography and other qualitative forms of analysis, thereby exposing the limitations of 
social science perspectives that favor quantitative analysis and commitments to 
methodological individualism; and (3) this work displays surprising affinities with insights 
from “dissident” traditions in theoretical biology, such as developmental systems theory 
and niche construction, which should be further developed. 
My argument is set out in four parts. Part 1 begins with Julian Steward’s “classic” 
mid-twentieth-century account of the cultural mediation of organism-environment 
connections, recalls the criticism it generated, and describes successor approaches like 
political ecology that became well established in the late twentieth century. By highlighting 
struggles to better account for the patterns Julian Steward attempted to capture in his 
distinction between the core and periphery of human cultural adaptations, this section 
shows how some anthropologists came to abandon the assumption that either “cultures” or 
“environments” could be unproblematically conceived as separate, self-contained entities. 
In addition, it shows how ethnographic work in colonial and post-colonial settings led some 
anthropologists to draw attention both to the capacities of human beings to rework 
cultural mediations in drastically altered environments, and to the importance of 
contextualizing these processes within fields of power. 
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Under conditions of post-Cold-War globalization, however, some anthropologists 
have found that political ecology cannot fully account for the remarkable ways people 
everywhere now mediate connections to contemporary environments, mixing and 
matching cultural objects and practices inherited from the past with cultural objects and 
practices imported from elsewhere. Part 2 showcases some of the innovative post-
positivist anthropological research that attempts to make sense of these processes. It also 
shows an imbalance in interdisciplinary exchanges between theoretical biology and 
anthropology, for this and other relevant anthropological work has been largely ignored by 
theoretical biologists who write about culture. I describe significant anthropological 
research inspired by thinkers like Charles Sanders Peirce, Bruno Latour, and Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, which can help theoretical biologists provide more nuanced accounts of 
the cultural mediation of human-environment connections. Finally, in Part 3, I show one 
way of more directly connecting this newer anthropological work to current work in 
theoretical biology. It turns out that key features of actor network theory, developed by 
Bruno Latour and his colleagues, bear a strong family resemblance to key features of niche 
construction, developed by John Odling-Smee and his colleagues. Drawing on a recent 
ethnography, I show how conceiving of constructed niches as actor-networks can provide a 
path that permits insights from cutting-edge post-positivist archaeology and cultural 
anthropology to enter into current discussions of organism-environment connections in 
theoretical biology, where they are badly needed. This move requires abandoning dualistic 
“nature-nurture” thinking for new perspectives that conceive of relations among human 
organisms, cultures, and environments in terms of  “natural-cultural” networks. But it also 
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promises to incorporate a more refined understanding of culture into theoretical biology, 
where it is long overdue. 
 
1 Cultural Ecology and its Progeny 
Any anthropological discussion of relations between human organisms and their 
environments must begin with Julian Steward because, as ecological anthropologist Emilio 
Moran observes, “Steward delimited, more than anyone before him, the field of 
human/environment interactions” (Moran 1990, 10). Indeed, Steward’s Theory of Culture 
Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution (1955) embodies both the achievements 
and the difficulties that continue to challenge anthropological thinking about culture, 
ecology, and evolution. This volume contains the fruit of Steward’s prewar ethnographic 
comparisons and theoretical innovation; his critiques of L. H. Morgan’s and E. B. Tylor’s 
nineteenth-century unilinear evolutionary schemes (and their twentieth-century 
descendant, the “universal” evolution of Leslie White and V. Gordon Childe); the lessons 
learned from Boasian “cultural relativist” ethnography; and the limitations of British 
functional anthropology. His multilinear evolutionary approach is meant to avoid the 
pitfalls of these alternatives, without abandoning scientific cause-and-effect explanations. 
Steward struggles mightily, however, to bind all these threads together: 
Whereas [Morgan, Tylor, Childe, and White] have sought to formulate 
cultural development in terms of universal stages, my objective is to seek 
causes of culture change. Since ‘evolution’ still strongly connotes the 
nineteenth-century view, I hesitate to use it but find no better term. 
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Chapter 2 of Steward’s book develops a method for recognizing the ways in which 
culture change is induced by adaptation to environment. This adaptation, an important 
creative process, is called cultural ecology, a concept which is to be distinguished from the 
sociological concepts “human ecology” or “social ecology.” The cross-cultural regularities 
which arise from similar adaptive processes in similar environments are functional or 
synchronic in nature. 
But no culture has achieved so perfect an adjustment to its environment that 
it is static. The differences which appear in successive periods during the 
development of culture in any locality entail not only increasing complexity, 
or quantitatively new patterns, but also qualitatively new patterns. 
Consequently, in the comparison of the history of two or more areas in which 
the cultural ecological processes are the same, it must be recognized that a 
late period in one area may be much more like a comparable late or 
homotaxially similar period in another area than the earlier periods in either 
area. Cultural development therefore must be conceptualized not only as a 
matter of increasing complexity but also as one of the emergence of 
successive levels of sociocultural integration…. Chapter 4 illustrates the 
application of this concept at a national-level system (1955, 5). 
Three additional concepts central to Steward’s cultural ecology were cultural type, 
cultural core, and form-function. 
The concept of cultural type … is based on the two frames of reference 
previously presented: cultural features derived from synchronic, functional 
and ecological factors and those represented by a particular diachronic 
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developmental level. Cross cultural regularities are . . . recurrent 
constellations of basic features—the cultural core—which have similar 
functional relationships resulting from local ecological adaptations and 
similar levels of sociocultural integration . . . . The concept of culture type is 
confronted by the apparent difficulty posed by the fact that forms, patterns, 
or structures differ greatly. Since, however, similar functions maybe served 
by different forms while similar forms may serve varied functions, the single 
concept of form-function is introduced. (1955, 5-6) 
Steward thus understood each cultural type he identified to be a 
synchronic/ecological and diachronic/developmental (and perhaps evolutionary) 
synthesis. Chapters 6-12 of his book discuss a series of cultural types “presented … 
according to their level of sociocultural integration” (1955, 6). These included what he 
called the “family band” (the lowest level); “patrilineal hunting bands” and “composite 
hunting bands” with “slightly higher levels of sociocultural integration”; “nonlocalized 
clans,” which “represent a higher level of sociocultural integration than localized lineages” 
and which “probably developed from such lineages many times in different parts of the 
world”; and complex civilizations that developed on the basis of irrigation agriculture, 
writing that “Chapter 11 shows how in each of these areas fundamentally similar cultural 
ecological adaptations entailed a similar historical sequence” (1955, 7).  In Chapter 12, he 
applies cultural ecology, levels of sociocultural integration, and culture type to “a complex 
contemporary society, Puerto Rico” (1955, 7).  
Steward’s approach was not lockstep: an “environmental possibilist,” he highlighted 
“instances where the interrelationship between culture and environment allows 
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considerable latitude or potential variation in sociocultural types. Where latitude is 
possible, historic factors may determine the nature of society” (1955, 6). Nevertheless, ten 
years after Theory of Culture Change appeared, cultural ecology had been thoroughly 
picked apart. Some anthropologists criticized Steward for assuming that “cultures,” rather 
than people, might adapt to environments. Others found Steward’s positivist analytic goals 
to be highly problematic. Recent ethnography was also revealing difficulties in the data 
Steward had used to construct his cultural types.  
Still, it is worth lingering a moment over Steward’s discussion of the culture core, 
which can be seen both as a jumping-off point for some later anthropological discussions of 
cultural change (e.g., dual inheritance theory), and as addressing issues of importance 
which these later discussions neglect: 
The concept of cultural core [is] the constellation of features which are most 
closely related to subsistence activities and economic arrangements. The 
core includes such social, political, and religious patterns as are empirically 
determined to be closely connected with these arrangements. Innumerable 
other features may have great potential variability because they are less 
strongly tied to the core. These latter, or secondary features, are 
determined to a greater extent by purely cultural-historical factors—by 
random innovations or by diffusion—and they give the appearance of 
outward distinctiveness to cultures with similar cores. Cultural ecology 
pays primary attention to those features which empirical analysis 
shows to be most closely involved in the utilization of environment in 
culturally prescribed ways. (1955, 37; boldface added)  
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That is, natural selection on “cultural variants” seems most applicable to what 
Steward calls “secondary features” of culture—those less strongly tied to the core, and free 
to vary “by random innovation or diffusion” (or, perhaps, by natural selection). Features of 
the culture core, by contrast, are basic to adaptive stability and are not similarly free. Today 
most anthropologists no longer accept Steward’s account of culture cores. However, a 
satisfactory account of the origin and stabilization of the kinds of cultural features that 
Steward attributed to culture cores remains elusive. In particular, “Darwinian” theories of 
cultural evolution that emphasize natural selection on cultural variants (e.g., Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Durham 1991) remain unable to account for 
those key features that Steward saw as indispensable for the culturally mediated 
adaptation of human organisms to their environments.  
Steward’s attempt to recast the study of cultural evolution by turning to ecology 
(rather than, for example, to population biology) directly shaped the next influential 
anthropological approach to (human) organism-environment interactions: the “new 
ecological anthropology” of Andrew P. Vayda and Roy Rappaport. Emilio Moran writes that 
Vayda and Rappaport  
found the concept of the culture core, and the cultural ecological approach, to 
give undue weight to culture as the primary unit of analysis, and found the 
presumption that organization for subsistence had causal priority to other 
aspects of human society and culture to be both untested and premature 
(Geertz 1963). (Moran 1990, 10) 
Moving from cultural ecology to ecological anthropology thus involved increasing the 
emphasis on biology relative to culture; as Conrad Kottak explains,  “the analytic unit 
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shifted from ‘culture’ to the ecological population, which was seen as using culture as a 
means (the primary means) of adaptation to environments” ([1999] 2006, 40). In addition, 
despite Steward’s misgivings about “functional or sociological formulations,” his successors 
embraced an intensified functional ecological analysis. Rappaport defined the ecological 
population as “an aggregate of organisms having a common set of distinctive means by 
which they maintain a common set of material relations with in the ecosystem in which 
they participate” (Rappaport 1971, 238; cited in Kottak [1999] 2006, 41). Their theoretical 
inspiration was cybernetics: systems theory and the role of negative feedback. “Cultural 
practices were seen as optimizing human adaptation and maintaining undegraded 
ecosystems” (Kottak [1999] 2006, 40). In this model, two analytic units were basic: (1) the 
ecological population, which might in some cases be said to correspond to a locally named 
group (such as the Tsembaga Maring of New Guinea) and (2) the ecosystem, a set of 
systemic environmental relationships that regulate themselves by means of negative 
feedback. Rappaport would later be criticized for his easy identification of ecological 
populations with locally named groups, for he could offer no explicit criteria distinguishing 
“ecological populations” from what other anthropologists called “cultures.” 
In Pigs for the Ancestors ([1968] 1984, 4), Rappaport claimed that the Tsembaga 
kaiko, or ritual pig sacrifice, regulates the frequency of warfare among neighboring tribes 
because it  
operates as a regulating mechanism in a system or set of interlocking 
systems, in which such variables as the area of available land, necessary 
lengths of fallow periods, size and composition of both human and pig 
 12
populations, trophic requirements of pigs and people, energy expended in 
various activities, and the frequency of misfortunes are included.  
Rappaport also insisted that it was important in ecological studies to distinguish 
between two different models of the environment: the cognized model, “the model of the 
environment conceived by the people who act in it” ([1968] 1984, 238) and the operational 
model, “which the anthropologist constructs through observation and measurement of 
empirical entities, events, and material relationships” ([1968] 1984, 237). Rappaport 
maintained that even if these two models overlapped, they were not identical and ought 
not to be confused.  
By the 1980s, however, other anthropologists working in communities that had 
experienced European or American colonization had begun to adopt views influenced by 
dependency theory and world systems theory. They argued persuasively that key factors 
responsible for shaping contemporary ecological practices in the so-called “tribal” societies 
anthropologists were studying had actually originated outside those societies themselves, in 
colonial metropoles or in the core of the capitalist world system (Frank 1967; Wallerstein 
1974; Wolf 1982).  Acknowledging the impact of Western imperialism rendered deeply 
problematic the assumption that “tribal” ecosystems (or “cultures”) were timeless, 
separate, self-contained, self-regulating entities. Accordingly, Rappaport was also criticized 
for uncritically accepting a “positivist” model of science that ignored history; this 
realization pushed many ecological anthropologists toward a political economic framework 
of analysis (Biersack 2006, 7; Goodman and Leatherman 1998).  
Still other anthropologists, however, were being attracted by new analytic 
frameworks coming from biology. In 1963, biologist Niko Tinbergen had published a paper 
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in which he argued that asking “why” any form of animal behavior occurs actually masks 
four separate questions about (1) the proximate (or immediate) causal explanation of the 
animal’s motivation; (2) the ontogenetic explanation of the behavior’s development across 
the animal’s life span; (3) the phylogenetic explanation, tracing the evolutionary history of 
the species-specific biological systems involved in the particular behavior; and (4) the 
functional (or ultimate) adaptive explanation,  showing how performing the behavior 
influences the individual organism’s ability to survive and reproduce (Tinbergen 1963). 
Tinbergen welcomed the extension of ethological methods to humans (Tinbergen 1963, 
430). Biological anthropologist Agustín Fuentes points out, however, that keeping all the 
“why” questions separate in the study of humans is very difficult, partly owing to a “bias 
toward the value of the ultimate, or functional, answer … which is seen as the most 
important ‘level’ of analysis in terms of evolutionary understanding (the quest to find 
human adaptations)” (2009, 29). These difficulties notwithstanding,   
the primacy of interest in Tinbergen’s ultimate question combined with a 
series of mathematical models and perspectives on the role of kin and 
altruism that arose in the 1960s and 1970s laid the foundation for the most 
pervasive and influential contribution to the study of the evolution of human 
behavior since the early 1900s: Wilsonian Sociobiology.” (Fuentes 2009, 29). 
In my experience, E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) landed like a 
bombshell in four-field anthropology departments across North America. For many 
anthropologists—particularly, although not exclusively, biological anthropologists—it 
seemed to be full of bright promise.  But many others—especially cultural and linguistic 
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anthropologists (but also some biological anthropologists and archaeologists) were 
dismayed or angered as Wilson arrogantly proclaimed, 
Sociobiology is defined here as the systematic study of the biological basis of 
all social behavior. For the present it focuses on animal societies . . . . But the 
discipline is also concentered with the social behavior of early man and the 
adaptive features of organization in the more primitive contemporary human 
societies. . . . It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social 
sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to 
be included in the Modern Synthesis (1975, 4).1 
As Fuentes explains, “[u]biquitous in this ‘new synthesis’ perspective was the 
primacy of ultimate explanations, a reliance on relatively linear mathematical models to 
model natural selection, and reduced concern with the physiological and genetic details of 
the mechanisms for behavioral adaptations” (2009, 30).  Approaching interactions between 
humans and their environments with such a toolkit, however, could only appear perverse 
to cultural anthropologists like Marshall Sahlins (1976a), whose understanding of human-
environment relations rested on human mobilization of complex, intricately interwoven 
                                                     
1 Although disrespect has been expressed on both sides of the divide, the kind of contempt often 
expressed by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists toward their critics has been particularly 
striking in my experience. Anthropologists and others committed to evolution, but critical of sociobiology, 
have risked being labeled “anti-science,” “anti-evolution,” or even “creationist.” As a result, many of us have 
had to adopt the position of “anti-antievolutionists,” who resist the critics of evolution, but who are unable to 
wholeheartedly affirm the hegemonic version of evolutionary theory (see Schultz 2009). The new 
developments and possibilities discussed in Parts 3 and 4 below may help change this state of affairs. 
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sets of cultural meanings and practices, resources deeply rooted in history and politics 
rather than in the genes.2 Critiques of sociobiology by anthropologists did not abate when 
sociobiology gave birth to evolutionary psychology, human behavioral ecology, and other 
variant perspectives (Marks 2009). For anthropologists who take culture seriously, 
however, Boyd and Richerson’s Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985) counts as an 
indispensable intervention in the debate. Using mathematical models to challenge the 
mathematical modelers, dual-inheritance theory defended culture in an idiom that 
sociobiologists found much harder to ignore. Of course, as noted above, anthropologists 
may still object to dual-inheritance theory on other grounds.  
Roy Rappaport did not respond to his critics by turning to sociobiology. On the 
contrary, the 1984 edition of Pigs for the Ancestors contains a 180-page long epilogue in 
which he addresses a range of complaints, and, in some cases, abandons positions he had 
formerly defended. Until his death in 1997, Rappaport continued to reject any sharp 
dichotomization between “nature” and “culture,” arguing instead that the human condition 
involves living “in terms of meanings in a physical world devoid of intrinsic meaning, but 
subject to causal law” (cited in Biersack 2006, 7); and his later work highlighted the ways 
in which political economic processes often promoted the “disordering of adaptive 
structures” of local populations.  
Put another way, “Rappaport’s intellectual trajectory drew him slowly, tacitly 
toward political ecology” (Biersack 2006, 8), an approach that attends to the ways 
                                                     
2 Sahlins began his career as a cultural evolutionary theorist (e.g. Sahlins and Service 1960). but his 
views about cultural evolution changed following his experiences in France in the late 1960s (see Sahlins 
1976b). 
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human/environment relations are shaped by political and economic processes. As Conrad 
Kottak explains, “a successor to ecological anthropology is the ‘new’ ecological, or 
environmental, anthropology, which blends theory with political awareness and policy 
concerns” (Kottak [1999] 2006, 40). For Aletta Biersack, the appeal of political ecology and 
environmental anthropology lies in the way that Marxist analysis, refracted through 
dependency theory and world systems theory, opens up the possibility of focusing “on 
human-nature relations in other than adaptationist and reductionist terms,” because power 
is seen as “sociohistorical and structural” (2006, 8). She continues: “The implication for 
ecology is that the local is subordinated to a global system of power relations and must be 
understood entirely with respect to that subjection, in terms of what is commonly referred 
to as capitalist penetration and its effect” (2006, 9). 
By the late 1980s, geographers and anthropologists doing political ecology were paying 
attention to linkages between global and local processes, an approach, Biersack says, that 
“continues to be productive today” (2006, 12).  
In this connection, it is worth considering the legacy of Andrew (“Pete”) Vayda, 
Rappaport’s co-creator of the “new ecological anthropology,” because his career over the 
past fifty years illustrates a willingness to grapple with many of the factors that are central 
to the post-positivist research I review below. One striking feature of Vayda’s work has 
been his ongoing critique of theoretical accounts of the cultural mediation of human 
relations to their environments, not excluding his own previous views: 
In the 1960s when “cultural ecology” was in vogue, he argued for a “human 
ecology” instead, and was a leader in the development of systems approaches 
to human-environment relations. However, in the early 1970s he joined his 
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students in criticizing the teleology and other excesses of systems-based 
human ecology, arguing instead for an agent-based approach. In recent years, 
he has taken on widely-held assumptions about the nature—and culture—of 
explanation in human-environment research, in the course of which he has 
developed an analytical methodology that is informed by the pragmatic view 
of scholars like Charles Sanders Peirce, David Lewis, Geoffrey Hawthorn, T. 
Chamberlin, H. L. A. Hart, and Tony Honoré. . . . More generally . . . Vayda has 
been highly critical of holism, essentialism, systems thinking, naïve 
functionalism, and speculative adaptationism in anthropology and human 
ecology. . . . He has also pointed to the dangers of a priori assumptions and 
ready-made theories such as those of some cognitive anthropologists and 
political and spiritual ecologists. (Walters and McCay 2008, 1-2) 
A second striking feature of Vayda’s scholarship is the extent to which his theorizing 
has been powerfully informed by his experiences in applied anthropological research, 
primarily in the forests of Indonesia and New Guinea. Introducing a recent collection of his 
own essays, Vayda (2009, ix) observes that  
an original stimulus for some of the essays was my desire to get at the causes 
of particular phenomena, like intergroup fighting in the mountains of New 
Guinea and extensive fires in the tropical moist forests of Indonesia. For 
other essays, the original stimulus was more my being dissatisfied—on 
logical, empirical, or pragmatic grounds—with research methods widely 
used or kinds of explanations commonly made in such fields or subfields as 
political ecology, Darwinian human behavioral ecology, and local knowledge 
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studies. Whatever the stimulus, going beyond my criticisms of the work of 
others and achieving better explanations and identifying ways of achieving 
them were among the positive goals I set myself.  
Illustrative of this restless field-based critique of theoretical accounts of human-
environment connections is an article Vayda co-wrote with Bradley Walters in 1999, 
entitled “Against Political Ecology.” Vayda and Walters were, in fact, not urging that a 
consideration of power relations be eliminated from ecological studies; rather, they were 
challenging ecological analyses that privilege the political, emphasizing instead the 
importance of a range of heterogeneous causal factors, none of which may be excluded a 
priori (Vayda 2009, Chapter 6). Vayda and Walters’ critique of narrowly political accounts 
of causation in ecological studies in anthropology bears a strong family resemblance to 
Bruno Latour’s critique of narrowly “social constructionist” accounts of causation in 
science studies (e.g., Latour and Woolgar 1986, Postscript). Vayda’s “evenemental or event 
ecology” (Vayda 2009, 13-34)—elsewhere called “progressive contextualization” (e.g., 
McCay 2008, 5)—bears an equally strong family resemblance both to the “constructivism” 
of Ludwik Fleck (Smith 2006, Chapter 3) and to actor network theory (e.g., Latour 2005; 
both Fleck 1979 and Latour 1988 appear in Vayda’s 2009 bibliography). 
These features of Vayda’s legacy are illustrated in Paige West’s ethnography 
Conservation is our Government Now: The Politics of Ecology in Papua New Guinea (2006). 
West follows the fortunes of Gimi people and their neighbors in the eastern highlands of 
New Guinea between 1994 and 1999, as they are drawn into a “conservation-as-
development” project funded by outsiders and designed and implemented by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) staffed by local and international conservation 
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experts. “It was promised that if Gimi and Pawaia gave their lands for inclusion in the 
[Crater Mountain] Wildlife Management Area, they would derive cash benefits, access to 
economic markets for the forest products tied to local biological diversity, and 
“development”; in other words, “conservation was to be the development” (West 2006, 5). 
By 1994, most Gimi involved in the project had already altered a number of earlier 
connections to their forests after converting to Seventh Day Adventism, which obliged 
them to alter their hunting practices give up pork. But their sense of identity was fluid, and 
they did not equate these changes with a loss of “traditional” Gimi culture. On the contrary, 
they expressed to West “the feeling that they had, and have, a choice about which 
‘traditional’ practices they wish to continue and which they wish to abolish” (2006, 66), 
and by the mid-1990s, many of them wanted “development.” However, the “development” 
they expected to receive in exchange for their cooperation with “conservation” were 
substantive goods and services (medicine, technology, education for their children), not 
cash and access to capitalist markets; in the event, neither was forthcoming to the degree 
anticipated, nor distributed evenly among all members of the community. When the project 
ended, both Gimi and the conservation practitioners were frustrated and dissatisfied.  
In the first chapter, West recounts an event that she witnessed in 1999, a knife fight 
between two Gimi men, Kelego and Lasini (2006, 15ff). Six pages from the end of the final 
chapter, West returns to the fight, and compares her account of this fight to the account 
offered by Napoleon Chagnon and Timothy Asch in their classic ethnographic film, The Ax 
Fight (Chagnon and Asch 1975). West draws both on Vayda’s critique of Darwinian 
ecological anthropology and his discussion of progressive contextualization to differentiate 
her approach from that of Chagnon:  
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While Chagnon’s goal with his reading of the ax fight is a positivist 
explanation, he is looking for answers about human nature that can be 
generalized from the Yanomamo to all people. I spent the past seven years 
looking for explanations for one fight between Kelego and Lasini and trying 
to trace out the causal chains that led up to it and the layers of meaning that 
encompass it (2006, 230.) 
West concludes that “The fight was about imbalances, both perceived and real, that 
have come into being because of the conservation-as-development project (2006, 231). But 
tracing the causal chains meant that West had to “try to disentangle the connections 
between New Guinea and New York, conservation and development, and birds of paradise 
and commodities” (2006, 4), efforts recounted in the body of her ethnography. West 
describes historical processes through which Gimi people entered into relations with a 
variety of outsiders, including colonial administrators, missionaries, linguists, 
ethnographers, environmentalists, and others. Over time, these relationships transformed 
both Gimi identity and the cultural practices Gimi people used to mediate their relations to 
living and nonliving features of their environments. But those environments themselves 
were expanded and restructured as they were connected to transnational institutions and 
resources situated within the global capitalist market.  
Exposing these entangled processes involved West in both archival research and 
fieldwork, among both Gimi people and conservation practitioners, both in New Guinea and 
New York. Multisited research complicated West’s understanding of the role of 
anthropology in analyzing how human groups use culture to mediate connections to their 
environments. The story she tells “is not a story of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ or even ‘the 
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Gimi’ and ‘the conservationists.’ It is a story about the social lives of people associated with 
a large bit of the forest in Papua New Guinea” (2006, xv).  Her final text, she insists, is 
neither a “translation or legibility-making service” for conservation activists nor “a 
devastating critique of conservation as a way of knowing and producing knowledge. . . . 
Rather, my goal is to provide an ethnography of the project and perhaps to persuade 
conservation practitioners, activists, scientists, and others to question the assumptions 
about nature, culture, and development that underlie many of today’s biodiversity 
conservation efforts” (2006, xviii). 
 
2 New Directions in Anthropological Studies of Organism-Environment Relations 
A rich conversation is in the making between anthropologists and biological 
theorists who write about the cultural mediation of human connections to their 
environments, but the exchange could be much more balanced.  In this section, I begin by 
reviewing the way some forms of theoretical biology have begun to shape recent 
anthropological thinking. But I end by presenting additional anthropological work that, like 
Paige West’s ethnography, merits serious consideration in discussions of the cultural 
mediation of human-environment connections in theoretical biology, but that so far has not 
been considered.  
Let us start by looking at the recent work of biological anthropologist Agustín 
Fuentes (2009). He analyzed five contemporary theoretical approaches to the evolution of 
human behavior that have influenced biological anthropology: Neo-Darwinian (ND) 
Sociobiology / Human Sociobiology, Human Behavioral Ecology (HBE), Evolutionary 
Psychology (EP), Gene-Culture Coevolution / Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT), and Memetics. 
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All five, he reminds us, take “Wilson’s sociobiology, Hamilton and Trivers’ kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism, and the Dawkinsian genic selfishness as baseline assumptions” (2009, 
37). All five claim Darwin as their inspiration, focus on natural selection as the architect of 
behavior, and tend to de-emphasize other processes of evolution recognized in the modern 
synthesis, such as gene flow and genetic drift. HBE and EP also emphasize the importance 
of Ernst Mayr’s’s distinction between ultimate and proximate levels of explanation (2009, 
62). But Fuentes is troubled by what all five leave out (Fuentes 2009, 62-63): 
Missing from HBE, EP, DIT, and Memetics is much of the evolutionary 
anthropological approach pioneered by Sherwood Washburn. In the 50 years 
since Washburn proposed his “New Physical Anthropology,” there has been 
an explosion in the paleoanthropological data base, resulting in a series of 
important changes and enhancements of the scenarios for human physical 
(and social) evolution. Unfortunately, ND-Sociobiology is the only one of 
these perspectives to regularly exploit both the fossil and archeological 
records and primate studies as comparative tools. Of the other four, HBE 
does occasionally incorporate fossil/archeological/primatological datasets 
(Hawkes et al. 2003) and EP uses assumed Pleistocene selection pressures as 
its baseline, but neither EP, CIT, or Memetics regularly use fossil or cross-
species comparisons in their construction of scenarios and hypotheses for 
the evolution of human behavior.  
To fill in the gaps, Fuentes (2009, 172) incorporates recent work that focuses 
attention on ontogeny: Jablonka and Lamb’s (2005) arguments for “evolution in four 
dimensions”, West-Eberhard’s (2003) arguments linking developmental plasticity to 
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evolution, Oyama’s (2000) developmental systems approach (see also Oyama et al. 2001), 
and the niche construction perspective developed by Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 
(2003). In particular, Fuentes (2009, 172-75) is persuaded that niche construction is an 
evolutionary force that can be tested against the human evolutionary record, and he and 
two colleagues recently performed such a test, proposing a new explanation for an old 
puzzle.  Between 2.5 and 1 million years ago, the fossil record shows that the genus Homo 
and the genus Paranthropus coexisted in eastern and southern Africa, but by 1 million 
years ago, Paranthropus was extinct, and Homo had expanded. Most explanations of this 
transition attribute it to the superior foraging efficiency of Homo, based on increased brain 
size, tool use, and meat consumption, the sharing of “cultural” information, and (recently) 
also to niche construction. However, Fuentes and colleagues “propose a model wherein a 
focus on the role of predation and differential ability to share information and 
cooperatively modify functional facets of the environment provide an important 
component of the explanation of the success of the genus Homo relative to . . . 
Paranthropus” (Fuentes et al. 2010, 436). Using evidence suggesting that both 
Paranthropus and Homo were likely vulnerable to the same predators, their model shows 
how niche construction could have made Homo less desirable as prey, shifting predation 
pressure onto Paranthropus, while at the same time providing positive feedback to 
protective niche-constructing behaviors in Homo. Overall, Fuentes recommends 
abandoning or deemphasizing optimality models, single-trait models, simple proxy 
measures of fitness, and the focus on DNA; retaining the focus on natural selection 
(together with niche construction), on the role of symbolic communication and culture, and 
on past and present environments; and expanding attention to plasticity, multilevel 
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selection on multiple inheritance systems, and the role of behavior as an agent of 
evolutionary change in humans (2009, 180-186). The outcome, he believes, will be a 
biocultural approach to the study of human behavior appropriate for the twenty-first 
century.  
Attention to ontogeny has also been central to the work of British anthropologist 
Tim Ingold. A Cambridge-trained social anthropologist who carried out fieldwork among 
Sami reindeer herders in Finland, Ingold grew dissatisfied with theoretical proposals 
treating human life “as merely consequential, the derivative and fragmentary output of 
patterns, codes, structures or systems variously defined as genetic or cultural, natural or 
social” (2011, 3). His own work, therefore, “has been driven by an ambition to reverse this 
emphasis: to replace the end-directed or teleonomic conception of the life-process with a 
recognition of life’s capacity continually to overtake the destinations that are thrown up in 
its course” (2011, 4). The result is a unique perspective on the relations between humans 
and their environments that innovatively combines insights from James Gibson, Susan 
Oyama,3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri 
Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari (Ingold 1990, 2007, 2011).  
Problematic accounts of the labor process led Ingold to explore the phenomenology 
of human productive accomplishment, and to conclude that production was not “about 
transforming the material world, but rather about participating in the world’s 
transformation of itself” (2011, 8).  Accordingly, he has taken up the challenge of 
                                                     
3 Ingold is the only anthropologist who contributed an essay to the DST compendium Cycles of 
Contingency (Oyama et al. 2001).  
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rehabilitating cosmologies denominated “animist” by Western thinkers: “once we 
recognize the primacy of movement in the animic cosmos … we are not required to believe 
that the wind is a being that blows. . . . Rather the wind is blowing, and the thunder is 
clapping, just as organisms and persons are living in the ways peculiar to each”  (2011, 73).  
Ingold has also written insightfully about the evolution of the human foot, and criticizes 
“the division of labor between hands and feet” that informs most discussions of the 
evolution of human bipedalism since Darwin (2011, chap. 3).  
Ingold’s ongoing reflections on the relations among anthropology, art, and 
architecture have attracted wide attention, inside and outside of anthropology. Recently, he 
has debated anthropologists and archaeologists who study material culture. All of them 
deplore nature/culture dualism, agreeing that matter has been unjustly neglected by 
positivist science. Ingold, however, rejects their attempts to generalize about “materiality,” 
insisting that 
so long as our focus in on the materiality of objects, it is quite impossible to 
follow the multiple trails of growth and transformation that converge, for 
instance, in the stuccoed façade of a building or the page of a manuscript. 
These trails are merely swept under the carpet of a generalized substrate 
upon which the forms of all things are said to be imposed or inscribed. I 
propose that we lift the carpet, to reveal beneath its surface a tangled web of 
meandrine complexity. (2011, 26) 
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Rehabilitating the status of matter has also been central for post-processual 
archaeologists4 wishing to incorporate into their accounts of the human past the cultural 
meanings of material artifacts for their makers and users. Because they regularly deal with 
things that neither speak nor carry written linguistic representations, these archaeologists 
need methods for studying non-linguistic meaning-making. Post-processual archaeologist 
Robert Preucel writes that  
material culture, like language, often plays a central role in mediating social 
identities and relations. However … material culture does not participate in 
the same kind of structured system as language. Objects are not words and 
there is nothing in material culture comparable to syntax or grammar in 
linguistics.  But because material culture has form and substance, it has the 
power to fix meanings in ways that are not possible in language. (2010, 84). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, post-processual archaeologists like Preucel who were 
disappointed by attempts to adapt Saussurean sémiologie for the study of material culture 
were inspired by the work of linguistic anthropologists like Michael Silverstein, who were 
                                                     
4 So-called “processual archaeology” emerged in the 1960s and is closely associated with the work of 
Lewis Binford (1962). It encompasses a variety of different approaches, but “all share a common processual 
orientation grounded in cultural evolutionary theory and a systemic view of culture” based on the 
structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss (Preucel 2010, 94). “Post-processual archaeology” encompasses a 
variety of different approaches sharing “a common dissatisfaction with the scientistic approach of much of 
processual archaeology, particularly its focus on positivism and general laws of human behavior. In its place 
they adopt hermeneutic methods and emphasize the social salience of ideology and power,” commenting, “as 
an empirical social science which privileges material culture, archaeology retains a strong modernist core and 
resists full colonization by poststructuralism and postmodernism” (Preucel 2010, 123). 
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questioning Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole. Research in linguistic 
anthropology showed that linguistic meaning in contexts of use depended heavily on 
speech, or parole, rather than on idealized symbolic meanings supposedly encoded in 
langue. But this meant that linguistic anthropologists needed a method of analysis that 
would allow them to study dimensions of meaning communication that were not purely 
symbolic. They found what they were looking for in the semiotics of Charles Sanders 
Peirce; some cultural anthropologists and post-processual archaeologists soon joined them. 
What resulted was the emergence of a pragmatic anthropology critical of the limitations of 
symbolic, structural and cognitive anthropology, but also resistant to the poststructural 
claims about the radical ambiguity of meaning (Preucel 2010, Chapter 4).  
Scholars in many fields are familiar with Peirce’s tripartite division of signs into 
icons, indices, and symbols. Michael Silverstein (1976) proposed that each of these sign 
functions constitutes a separate mode of meaningfulness, and argued that indices are 
indispensable for the study of language in use. Silverstein and others later demonstrated a 
variety of ways in which indexicality is mobilized ideologically by speakers to modify 
linguistic structures in contexts of use (Silverstein 1985).  When Preucel and other 
archaeologists reviewed Peirce’s writings about signs, they discovered that by the time of 
his death in 1906, Peirce had elaborated a typology of at least 66 signs that linked icons, 
indices, and symbols both to their interpretants and to other signs (Preucel 2010. 56-60). 
In a historical archaeology project at Brook Farm, Massachusetts, Preucel uses Peirce’s 
typology to explicate a range of different kinds of meanings mediated for their original 
Transcendentalist residents by the buildings they used and built. He also shows how these 
meaningful architectural mediations were undermined when later residents, committed to 
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Fourierism, and with different class origins, promoted a different kind of communal 
architecture at odds with Transcendental cultural practices. Preucel concludes that the 
varied buildings used and constructed by Transcendentalists were “a material expression 
of the Transcendentalist celebration of the individual in society” that also exercised “house 
agency” as they “actively engendered certain habits of thought and social practices at the 
core of Transcendentalism” (2010, 209). 
Semiotic archaeology is not the only variety of post-processual archaeology that 
investigates relations between human organisms and their environments, but it is a 
provocative “dissident” version. Another dissident version is the “social archaeology” 
tradition associated with Ian Hodder. Over the past thirty years Hodder’s career has taken 
him from processual to post-processual archaeology5 and he is surely the most influential 
post-processual archaeologist at work today.  Hodder is probably best known among 
anthropologists who are not archaeologists for his work in ethnoarchaeology: in the 1970s, 
he carried out ethnographic fieldwork in several East African societies to test the 
correlation between distributions of material artifacts and the social identities of their 
makers and users. Hodder’s conclusion that such connections were unreliable set him apart 
from Lewis Binford, who also carried out ethnoarchaological research, but drew the 
opposite conclusion. 
 Over the years, Hodder has published a series of texts in which he has relentlessly 
explored the consequences for archaeology that follow from challenges to its former 
identity as a disinterested scientific enterprise. In recent years, these challenges have come 
                                                     
5 A term he coined (Preucel 2010, 126). 
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not only from indigenous communities who connect archaeology with colonial domination 
and expropriation, and from government laws mandating repatriation of human remains 
and artifacts, but also from epistemological challenges by science studies scholars like 
Bruno Latour. While acknowledging the close ties that still bind many processual 
archaeologists to the tenets of positivist philosophy of science, Hodder has chosen to 
embrace the challenges of reflexive scrutiny and the critique of positivist science. He has 
addressed in detail the issues surrounding hermeneutical analysis in science, arguing that 
even though the whole of an archaeological site is understood in relation to its parts, “this 
circle of part-whole relationships is not vicious. . . .Rather, the objects of study can cause us 
to change our ideas about the whole or about the relationship between the parts. This 
circle can best be described as a spiral” (1999, 33). He has incorporated ideas from science 
studies to open up archaeological concepts like the chaîne opératoire, which specifies the 
sequence of practices that produces particular material artifacts (1999, 76). Hodder honors 
the skills archaeologists have developed to trace long-term and large-scale cultural 
processes, but he insists they must also develop narrative techniques for interpreting, 
whenever possible, the human activities they are able to reconstruct at a human scale: 
“both are needed in an archaeology which accepts diversity, uncertainty and relationality 
in human behavior” (1999, 147). 
Because he acknowledges, but goes beyond, the resolutely local, phenomenological 
focus of Ingold, Hodder cannot avoid coming to terms with heterogeneous global flows of 
wealth, commodities, people, images and ideologies that have been unleashed since the end 
of the Cold War. Indeed he must do so, for his ongoing archaeological project at Çatalhöyök, 
in Turkey, is sustained by these flows: it is financed by private capital, employs local and 
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international workers, requires the ongoing support of local and national governments, 
attracts tourists from Turkey and elsewhere, and for some years has had a presence on the 
internet (http://www.catalhoyuk.com/).  Hodder has paid close attention to the work of 
Arjun Appadurai, an anthropologist whose book Modernity at Large (1996) has profoundly 
shaped cultural anthropologists’ understanding of these global flows (Appadurai et al. 
2001). Like Ingold, Appadurai turns to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1988) 
for language capable of articulating “the special problems that beset the production of 
locality in a world that has become deterritorialized” (1996, 188). But the global lines of 
flight Appadurai describes generate heterogeneous, hybrid forms of movement spun out of 
rootlessness, alienation, and transgenerational instability of knowledge, with both points of 
departure and points of arrival in cultural flux (1996, 29, 43, 44).  
Nevertheless, Appadurai also argues that an upside to globalization can be 
perceived when new global technologies and connections are mobilized to solve old 
problems (1996, 43).  This phenomenon may be glimpsed at the Çatalhöyök Research 
Project, where Hodder and his collaborators have worked for some years to develop and 
institutionalize reflexive archaeological practices that now are mediated by a sophisticated 
computer database providing access, in different ways, to field staff, laboratory specialists, 
and internet viewers. Perhaps most innovative of all is the project’s employment of cultural 
anthropologists specializing in science studies, who carry out participant observation on 
the entire research process and feed back their insights into the ongoing project (Hodder 
1999, chap. 10). 
I conclude with one final example illustrating my conviction that archaeology may 
be the most lively source of innovative thinking in contemporary anthropology. In some 
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ways, Nicole Boivin’s recent volume Material Cultures, Material Minds: The Impact of Things 
on Human Thought, Society, and Evolution (2008) brings my observations in this section full 
circle. Trained at Cambridge University in the Hodderian social archaeology tradition, 
Boivin insists that the physicality of matter gives things agency that is independent of 
human organisms. While she was studying domestic space in rural Rajasthan, India, she 
noticed that 
much of the way that houses assumed a social and symbolic role relied on the 
use of soil to create them. . . . Mud houses are infinitely malleable, and are 
constantly plastered and replastered in ways that enable them to acquire a 
new appearance, texture and feel. . . . I thus began to think about the first 
mud houses and how they may accordingly have played a role in generating 
new symbolic and social possibilities within prehistoric society (2008, 133-
34). 
Boivin eventually concluded that “soil was an active agent in the process of 
Neolithicization in the eastern Mediterranean, among many other active agents, both 
human and non-human” (2008, 138), and she found Tim Ingold’s arguments helpful for 
imagining how domesticated species and artifacts might emerge “as a result of the ‘mutual 
involvement of people and materials in an environment’ in which outcomes cannot always 
be anticipated“ (2008, 156). She acknowledged that “locating agency is a complex exercise 
that probably demands a new way of thinking about it, as well as about humans and things” 
(2008, 168), and she found such a new way of thinking in actor network theory (2008, 
176). Combining insights from Tim Ingold and Bruno Latour, she then determined that “the 
realms of technology and environment become difficult to differentiate” (2008, 178). This 
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realization led to an extended exploration of niche construction, development, and 
cognitive plasticity, in which Odling-Smee, et al. (2003) and Oyama et al. (2001) are 
prominent sources (2008, 197, 220). Boivin closes her discussion by urging cognitive 
scientists to pay attention to archaeologists and anthropologists, and for niche construction 
theorists to talk to social anthropologists: “Material culture, which by very definition 
straddles [the social sciences and humanities,] demands an integrated approach that brings 
these very different models together” (2008, 229). In this way, citing many of the same 
sources who inspired Fuentes, Boivin likewise echoes Fuentes’s call for an integrative 
anthropological approach that is “holistic, messy, but potentially highly profitable” 
(Fuentes 2009, 249). 
 
3  Integrating Post-positivist Anthropology into Theoretical Biology: A Proposal 
In this section, I propose a theoretically informed way of articulating neglected work 
in post-positivist anthropology into analyses by theoretical biologists of the cultural 
mediation of human-environment connections. Paige West’s work in Papua New Guinea, 
discussed in Part 2, is a good place to begin. West writes that she has begun to see her role 
and the purpose of her work as related to a “new ethnography of development” that “takes 
seriously the governmentality of projects—the fact that social lives, environments, and 
subjects come to make and be made by the productive power of the structures created by 
projects (Foucault 1977)—and the social interactions during all sorts of projects (be they 
conservation, development, or resource extraction) which create new communities (Golub 
200[6]).” Because projects like this are remaking people’s environments all over the world, 
ignoring them in accounts that attempt to describe the cultural mediation of a human 
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population to its environment cannot continue. The highland village of Maimufa where 
West carried out much of her fieldwork was a hybrid community, consisting not only of 
Gimi people, but also of numerous non-Gimi from Australia, the United States, and 
elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, jointly engaging with Gimi people and their neighbors in 
the conservation-as-development project. West carried out participant-observation among 
the conservation scientists as well as the Gimi residents because the causal interventions of 
the scientists could not be ignored:  
The value of the eagle is not in and of the eagle, though its commodification 
might make it seem so—it is a value produced by a set of social relations of 
production in science and in the imagination of scientists. And what of the 
labor and value that went into the eagle that is forgotten as it becomes a 
commodity? That labor is the labor of scientific practice (Latour 1987:7), and 
the nature of the bird is its relation to all the processes of the forest that it 
influences and that influence it. (2006, 212) 
Or, to put it another way, the eagle is an actor network. Latour (2011, 797-798) has 
recently defined an actor network as follows: 
In its simplest but also in its deepest sense, the notion of network is of use 
whenever action is to be redistributed. . . . Take any object: At first, it looks 
contained within itself with well-delineated edges and limits; then something 
happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe, and suddenly you discover 
swarms of entities that seem to have been there all along but were not visible 
before and that appear in retrospect necessary for its sustenance. You 
thought the Columbia shuttle was an object ready to fly in the sky, and then 
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suddenly, after the dramatic 2003 explosion, you realize that it needed NASA 
and its complex organizational body to fly safely in the sky . . . . The action of 
flying a technical object has been redistributed throughout a highly 
composite network where bureaucratic routines are just as important as 
equations and material resistance. . . . What was invisible becomes visible, 
what had seemed self-contained is now widely redistributed. . . . the search 
for the production of object and of objectivity is totally transformed now that 
they are portrayed simultaneously in the world and inside their networks of 
production. 
Let us now return to Nicole Boivin, who pulled together insights from Tim Ingold, 
Bruno Latour, developmental systems theory, and niche construction. As an archaeologist, 
the affinities between actor-network thinking and niche construction helped her 
understand that the physicality of matter gives things agency independent of human 
organisms. DST theorist Susan Oyama is also sensitive to actor-network thinking in her 
own thinking about developmental systems, noting that the “swarms of entities” to which 
Latour refers above (called actants in actor network theory) bear a family resemblance to 
the “interactants” Oyama identifies as components of developmental systems (2000, 123). 
Actor-network theory appeals to her for an additional reason as well: 
Latour (1987:71-72) has described the scientist as the spokesperson for that 
which is studied. One of the many reasons I have found it worthwhile to think 
and write in developmental systems terms is that it allows me to speak for 
the background—the mute, manipulated materials, the featureless surround. 
Sometimes the peripheral is the political. (2000, 126) 
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Developmental systems theory and niche construction seem to require joint 
consideration (Oyama et al. 2001), because niche construction draws attention to the ways 
in which organisms make themselves, in part, by making their own environments. With 
Boivin, I agree that niche construction and actor-network theory also require joint 
consideration, and suggest that this may be more easily facilitated once it is recognized that 
both views rely on the same mechanism. According to John Odling-Smee and his colleagues, 
a major motivation for their development of a theory of niche construction was the desire 
to link ecological studies that focused on abiotic processes with ecological studies that 
focused on biotic processes. Bruno Latour has written: “As soon as you start to have doubts 
about the ability of social ties to durably expand, a plausible role for objects might be on 
offer” (2005, 75). Odling-Smee and his colleagues apparently came to a similar conclusion, 
which led them to propose the concept of an “artifact,”  
a third kind of object in ecosystems that is neither biotic nor conventionally 
abiotic, but intermediate between the two. Artifacts are not alive, yet they 
can only be built by living organisms. Also, once built, they are likely to 
respond to niche-constructing organisms in a different way from either biota 
or raw abiota. (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 190) 
The concept of artifact allowed them to propose a second concept, the 
environmentally mediated genotypic association (EMGA), in which constructed artifacts 
mediate between one population of organisms and another by modifying the selection 
pressures experienced by the second population: 
If, in a single population, genetic variation is expressed in a niche-
constructing phenotype that affects natural selection acting on other genes in 
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the same population, then the population will merely codirect its own 
evolution. However, if the niche construction modifies natural selection 
acting on genes in a second population, then the first population will now 
codirect the evolution. Conceivably, the induced change in the second 
population could feed back to the first population in the form of another 
modified natural selection pressure. The two populations would therefore 
coevolve through niche construction. (2003, 23) 
To me, an EMGA looks suspiciously like a stripped-down proto-actor-network for 
two reasons: (1) because it is a heterogeneous assemblage linking together living and non-
living actants within an ecological network, and (2) because each actant contributes its 
own causal influence to the network’s activity—i.e., serves as a mediator—rather than 
serving as an intermediary that merely transports causation without affecting it (Latour 
2005, 39). Biota, abiota, and artifacts would all seem to be mediators, rather than 
intermediaries, since they all have the capacity both to respond to further niche 
construction and to modify natural selection pressures (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 191). 
Latour also contrasts the way that an assemblage of heterogeneous mediators can 
be stabilized (or black-boxed) and turned into a unified whole that acts as one and is 
capable of transporting agency without affecting it. But black-boxed intermediaries can 
degenerate into networks of mediators, as, for example, when complex pieces of technology 
break down. Odling-Smee et al.’s EMGAs appear to have these properties. First, “niche-
constructing organisms work in open systems,” which means that they can “potentially 
drive some selected components of their environments in both thermodynamic directions, 
by either locally increasing or locally decreasing entropy levels.” Second, “like organisms, 
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artifacts demonstrate negative rather than positive entropy because they are usually quite 
highly organized; yet, unlike organisms, they have no ability to defend their own 
organization nor to prevent their own dissipation. Artifacts are therefore likely to demand 
repetitive niche construction from organisms to maintain them” (2003, 190). 
If these parallels are persuasive, actor-network theory might provide a bridge that 
allows work in post-positivist anthropology to be articulated with developmental systems 
theory and niche construction in theoretical biology—thereby allowing “history” to be 
incorporated into discussions of “evolution.” Actor-network thinking already informs 
ethnographic studies in science, technology, and medicine. But it is also implicit in the 
ethnography of development. Paige West draws readers’ attention to the “abiotic” artifacts 
that sustained life in her field settings. The cultural mediations she describes involved not 
just “humans” in the lump, but a specific heterogeneous community of humans composed 
of Gimi people and outsiders from Australia, the United States, and elsewhere in Papua 
New Guinea; and they are connected not just to “the environment” in the lump, but to 
specific mountains and forests, to birds of paradise and trees with harpy eagle nests, to 
game animals, and to swiddens. These heterogeneous living actants intertwined with 
heterogeneous nonliving actants: the tools of the hunters and farmers, such as bush knives; 
imported tinned fish that replace the pork they no longer eat; dwellings for residents, five 
church buildings, a health post perennially out of medicine, and a school. Particularly 
salient are the village airstrip and planes run by the Seventh Day Adventist Church that 
provide the community’s sole link to the outside world in the absence of roads: “The point 
cannot be made too strongly—everything that comes to Maimafu comes on an airplane . . . 
The village airstrip is the site of new things, ideas, people, money” (2006, 76). The airstrip 
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is also the site where important goods, like locally grown cash-crop coffee, go out: “all 
residents of Maimafu have to pay freight charges. . . to the missionary planes that pick the 
coffee up and take it to Goroka [the provincial capital]. . . . The airfreight charges paid to the 
mission planes fluctuate according to the price of fuel, thus tying Maimafu and other rural 
places that grow ‘airstrip coffee’ to the global political economy of oil” (2006, 106). 
In her description of the knife fight, West also observed that Kelego was wearing a 
bath towel around his neck that had been given to him by a visiting biologist. “It is not the 
material nature of the towel that is most important to him,” she writes. “Rather, the 
importance. . . is the meaning of the exchange with the biologist [showing] that he has a tie 
to conservation and to someone who is somewhere else” (2006, 15).  And yet, as Latour 
reminds us, the towel as a material actant plays an indispensable role as one of those 
objects that enables social ties to durably expand.  
Niche-construction, explicitly informed by actor-network theory, would therefore 
consider the role of “the social” in the production of space, but “the social” would be 
reconceptualized in terms of “collectives,” in which humans are attached to nonhumans, 
living and nonliving, physical and nonphysical (Latour 2005). Acknowledging this would 
mean, among other things, that organisms, cultures, and environments would need to be 
approached as emergent hybrid products of “natureculture” (Haraway 2008, 6-7; Latour 
1993, 7). For example, it would mean acknowledging the naturalcultural heritage of Gimi 
country itself: as West argues, “The biodiversity that exists in and around Maimafu is the 
by-product of human habitation and use. . . .The people of Maimafu,  through the 
subsistence patterns that the NGO wishes to curtail, produced the landscape in which they 
live. So there is, therefore, no ‘pristine condition’ to preserve” (2006, 178).  
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A natural-cultural, actor-network understanding of niche construction might help 
resolve the problems faced by Steward and other analysts, inside and outside of 
anthropology, who have struggled to fit culture and history into discussions of human 
(cultural) adaptation and (cultural) evolution. For example, there was nothing predestined 
about Gimi country becoming the location of a biodiversity conservation project; it was a 
serendipitous development, connected to the fact that the husband of an ethnographer 
working among Gimi people in the 1970s took an interest in birds of paradise (2006, 130-
131). But that contingent event led to a conservation-as-development project that 
mobilized features of the naturalcultural constructed niches of Gimi people and of outside 
conservation practitioners; both were “folded into each other,” leading to the emergence of 
a powerful hybrid naturalcultural construct, the Crater Mountain Wildlife Management 
Area, (2006, 32). The results of that process, for good and for ill, could not easily foreseen 
or controlled, but may be explored and explained in part by post-positivist ethnographers 
and their allies. 
Cultivating “naturalcultural” thinking by elaborating niche construction with 
insights from actor network theory could help biological theorists grapple with a range of 
issues tied to the very basic connections that organisms, particularly human organisms, 
forge with their environments. As Ian Hodder has recently observed,  
the brute matter of things has effects on us that go beyond social meaning. 
We cannot reduce things solely to the relational, to a semiotics of things. To 
do so undermines the power of things to entrap, and particularly to trap the 
more vulnerable whether these be the victims of the AIDS virus, the work 
gang bound by chains, the women bound by child rearing, the populations 
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bound by global agricultural systems. . . .  There is much to be done in terms 
of understanding the different paths we have taken as humans, caught up in 
our varied ways with things. But the big picture is clear. Since a dependence 
on made things became an evolutionary pathway, there has been one long 
movement, initially slow, but speeding up exponentially as the strands of 
human-thing entanglement lengthened and intensified. (2012, 220) 
If attachments to things are part of our evolutionary pathway, expecting to escape 
from them, in theory or in life, is futile. Rather, the task, as Latour tells us, “is no longer a 
matter of abruptly passing from slavery to freedom by shattering idols, but of 
distinguishing those attachments that save from those that kill” (2010, 61).  
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